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The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") represents "a
clear and comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination
against individuals with disabilities and to bring persons with
disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American
life."' Individuals with disabilities now have a civil rights statute that
celebrates "the 'new' disabled man/woman-independent, free, loud
and proud... recogni[zing] that people with disabilities can excel in
all kinds of functions and roles."' 2 But the recent Supreme Court
cases known collectively as the Sutton trilogy3 may have dramatically
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2001; B.A.,
University of Oregon, 1997. I would like to thank Paul Grossman and Katie Kimmel for
their insights and advocacy; and also Craig Pell, Liz Doherty and Ellen McDonnell for
their tireless editing, advice and support. Many thanks to Ben Hebel for his support and
encouragement.
1. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,304.
2. ARLENE B. MAYERSON & MATTHEW DILLER, DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUCATION
AND DEFENSE FUND INC., DREDF STATEMENT ON THE RECENT SUPREME COURT
DEFINITION OF DISABILITY CASES, at http://www.dredf.org/statement.html (last visited
Feb. 24,2001).
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altered this effect for the over fifteen million Americans with
diabetes.4
People with diabetes have traditionally been covered under the
ADA. Diabetes is an example of an impairment in Congressional
reports on the ADA 5 and it is also used as an example in the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regulations.6
While Sutton does not explicitly state that individuals with diabetes
are not disabled,7 those individuals may have more difficulty proving
a disability because of Sutton's restrictive interpretation of disability.
Courts must now examine individuals with diabetes, and all
individuals, in their treated, or "mitigated" state, to decide if they are
disabled. 8 Many people can substantially control their diabetes with
insulin. But this mitigating (and life-saving) measure may, under
Sutton, cost them the protections of the ADA.
This Note focuses on Americans with diabetes and their status as
individuals with disabilities under the ADA post Sutton. Part I details
the Sutton Court's interpretation of the ADA's employment
provisions and the EEOC guidelines. 9 Part II explains diabetes: the
disease itself, its side-effects, and complications with and without the
mitigating measure of insulin. Part III highlights problems that
Sutton raises or did not address. Part IV offers strategies and
solutions for individuals with diabetes who area attempting to bring
anti-discrimination cases under the ADA.
I. Current State of the Law-ADA, Sutton, and Beyond
A. Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA promised a new future to Americans with disabilities,
"a future of inclusion and integration, and the end of exclusion and
3. See Albertson's, Inc. v.' Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv. Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
4. See AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, DIABETES FACTS AND FIGURES, at
http://www.diabetes.org/ada/facts.asp (last visited Feb. 24,2001) [hereinafter ADA, FACrS
AND FIGURES].
5. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
451.
6. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (2000).
7. See AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, DIABETES ADVOCACY, at http://www.
diabetes.org/councils/fa199/advocacy.html (last visited Feb. 24,2001).
8. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488-89.
9. In the interests of time and space this note will focus on employment
discrimination, even though the ADA covers much more ground than that.
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segregation."'10 It provided a new forum to deal with discrimination,
stereotypes, and exclusion of individuals with disabilities." The ADA
prohibits covered employers from discriminating against a "qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability... in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.' 12
To bring a claim under the ADA, a petitioner must have any one
or more of these three characteristics:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.' 3
The inquiry does not end there, however; the petitioner must still be a
"qualified individual."'14 This means that the individual must be able
to perform the essential functions of a job with or without reasonable
accommodations.' 5  Accessibility of existing facilities, job
restructuring, and modified work schedules are examples of
reasonable accommodations.' 6
B. EEOC Regulations Implementing the Equal Employment Provisions of
the ADA
The EEOC regulations provide, define, and clarify the
employment provisions of the ADA.17 These regulations are only
persuasive; they are not binding on the courts.18
The EEOC regulations define a physical impairment as "[a]ny
physiological disorder, or condition.., affecting one or more of the
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense
organs, respiratory,... cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin and endocrine."'19  The
regulations are explicit that an impairment should be viewed "without
10. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 26 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,449.
11. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 only prohibits disability discrimination by entities
receiving federal funding. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (1994).
12. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994)
(emphasis added).
13. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 3,42 § 12102(2) (1994).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
15. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 108, § 12111(8).
16. Id. § 12111(9).
17. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2000).
18. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471,479 (1999).
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1).
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regard to mitigating measures such as medicines or assistive or
prosthetic devices .... For example, an individual with epilepsy
would be considered to have an impairment even if the symptoms of
the disorder were completely controlled by medicine. '20
The House Reports on the ADA also find that the "impairment
should be assessed without considering whether mitigating
measures... would result in a less-than-substantial limitation."'21 One
justification for assessing disability without considering mitigating
measures is the idea that these measures do not "cure," or get rid of,
the disability. A prosthetic limb does not cure the absence of a leg,
nor does insulin rid one's body of diabetes. Rather, these measures
make the person's daily life easier.
Under the EEOC, major life activities are defined as "functions
such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."22 The language
of the guidelines suggests that the list is not exclusive and courts,
including the Supreme Court, have agreed.3
For a life activity to be substantially limited, the individual must
be:
Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform; or
Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under
which the average person in the general population can perform the
same major life activity.24
The EEOC details some factors that may be used in deciding a
substantial limitation, such as the nature of the impairment and its
severity, duration, and any permanent or long-term impacts z The
EEOC specifically cites diabetes as an impairment that substantially
limits individuals: "a diabetic who without insulin would lapse into a
coma would be substantially limited because the individual cannot
perform major life activities without the aid of medication. '26
20. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (2000).
21. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,451.
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
23. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbot 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (finding that the EEOC list is
not exhaustive and that reproduction is a major life activity because of its significance to
life).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1).
25. Id. § 1630.20)(2).
26. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (2000).
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With respect to the major life activity of working, the EEOC
further narrows the definition. An individual is not substantially
limited in working if her disability only precludes her from
performing a single, specific job 27 Instead, she must be restricted
from performing "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes" compared to someone with comparable skills,
training and ability.28
The EEOC regulations also provide clarification for the "record
of" and "regarded as" prongs of the disability definition. There is a
record of a disability when an employer relies upon a record that
indicates that the employee has or had a substantially limiting
impairment.29 These types of records include educational, medical, or
employment records 30 This disability definition was established to
ensure that employers do not discriminate against qualified
individuals who have recovered from their disability.31
The third prong of the disability definition covers situations
where an individual is "regarded as" being disabled.32 This definition
is satisfied when the employer believes the individual has a
substantially limiting impairment. 33  It does not matter if the
employee has an impairment or not, or if the impairment is actually
limiting in any way; only the employer's perception is relevant.34 This
prong was added to combat the many stereotypes that are associated
with disabilities: "[s]ociety's accumulated myths and fears about
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from the actual impairment." 35
C. Sutton and Beyond...
The Sutton trilogy is composed of three cases clarifying the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the meaning of disability under the
ADA.36 In finding that an individual's disability status should be
based on her condition with mitigating measures, the Court resolved a
27. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
28. Id.
29. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k).
30. lId
31. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
334.
32. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 108,42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1).
34. lId
35. Sch. Bd. Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,284 (1987).
36. See generally cases cited supra note 3.
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major circuit split.37 While most circuits had been following the
EEOC regulations, the Tenth Circuit, where Sutton originated, had
not.38
In Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc., twin sisters with severe myopia
sued United Air Lines for failing to hire them as commercial airline
pilots. 39 United Air Lines had a vision requirement of 20/100 or
better.40 The petitioners claimed that they were disabled under the
ADA because their myopia was a substantially limiting impairment 41
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that "[b]ecause petitioners
allege that with corrective measures their vision 'is 20/20 or better' ...
they are not actually disabled... if the 'disability' determination is
made with reference to these measures." 42
Part of the Court's justification in Sutton is based on a plain
language interpretation of the ADA; the Court does not defer to the
EEOC guidelines. 43  The ADA requires that the disability
determination must be an individualized inquiry "not necessarily
based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment... but rather the
effect... on the life of the individual." 44 According to Sutton, this
individualized inquiry demands that individuals be judged in their
mitigated states. 45 To look at an individual in an unmitigated state
requires speculation about her condition and would lead to
assumptions about how the impairment generally affects people.46
The Court was troubled that this "unmitigated" view requires that all
people with diabetes would then be considered disabled, even though
a given individual may not actually be impaired because insulin is
helping control blood sugar levels.47
37. See Stephen F. Befort and Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial
Dissonance, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination
Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27,41 (1999).
38. Stacie E. Barhorst, Note, What Does Disability Mean: The Americans with
Disability Act of 1990 in the Aftermath of Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson's, 48 DRAKE L.
REV. 137,146-47 (1999).
39. 527 U.S. 471,475-76 (1999).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 476.
42. Id. at 481.
43. See id. at 482. For the Court's full discussion on the applicability of the EEOC
regulations, see id. at 475-85.
44. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (2000).
45. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488.
46. Id. at 483.
47. Id.
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The Sutton sisters also alleged that United "regarded" them as
substantially limited in the activity of working.48 They claimed that
United's vision requirements for global pilots were based on
stereotypes.49 The Court disagreed. These vision requirements were
not enough to prove that United regarded the sisters as disabled,
because the requirements only applied to a single job.50 To be
substantially limited in the life activity of working, the law requires
that an individual be limited in a broad range of jobs.51 This opinion
also calls into question the viability of the working life activity
generally by "assuming without deciding" its validity.52
Justice Stevens' dissent in Sutton disputed that the plain language
of the ADA requires examining individuals in their mitigated state.
Congress was concerned not only with individuals who were actually
presently disabled, but also those who are no longer disabled.53 This
concern prompted lawmakers to include section (B) of the disability
definition: "a record of a disability. '5 4 Therefore, disability under the
ADA should not consider mitigating measures.
Justice Stevens characterized the majority's reasoning as
concluding "that the ADA's safeguards vanish when individuals make
themselves more employable by ascertaining ways to overcome their
physical or mental limitations."55 This is also contrary to the Act,
which was passed, in part, to encourage the employment of disabled
individuals.5 6 The dissent also disagreed with the majority view that
examining individuals in their untreated state leads to speculation.57
Justice Stevens argued that this examination instead "simply requires
examining an individual's ability in a different state. '58
Murphy v. United Parcel Service follows the Sutton decision
almost exactly.59 Murphy was an individual with hypertension that he
controlled through medication.60 He was fired because UPS believed
that his blood pressure was too high for him to qualify as a
48. Id. at 476.
49. Id. at 490.
50. lId at 490-91.
51. See supra Part I.B.
52. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492-93.
53. Id. at 498-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,334.
55, Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2000).
57. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 508-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 509.
59. 527 U.S. 516, 518-19 (1999).
60. Id. at 519.
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commercial driver under the Department of Transportation
regulations.61 The Court, relying on Sutton, promptly dismissed his
claim because in his medicated state he was not an individual with a
disability.62 Murphy did not claim that he was substantially limited
while taking his medications; therefore, the Court made no ruling on
that situation.63
The third case in the trilogy is Albertson's v. Kirkingburg.64
Kirkingburg had an eye condition that gave him monocular vision in
one eye and 20/200 vision in the other.65 This led him to mentally
develop a "different" way of seeing; his body created its own
mitigating measure.66 Unlike Sutton and Murphy, Albertson's focused
more fully on whether Kirkingburg was a qualified individual, but it,
too, clings to the Sutton holding regarding mitigating measures. 67 The
Court found that there is no difference between artificial measures
and measures the body undertakes on its own.68 The Court again
followed Sutton and found that Kirkingburg had to be examined in
his mitigated state.69
The Sutton trilogy marks a major shift in disability discrimination
analysis. By not following the regulations and by examining
individuals in their mitigated states, Sutton and its progeny have made
disability discrimination claims potentially more difficult to prove for
some individuals. People with diabetes especially are greatly affected
by this change because of their insulin use. They provide a good
example of the difficulties that plaintiffs might encounter. Their
situation also presents an opportunity for suggesting creative
solutions that they can employ.
Few diabetes cases have come through the courts since Sutton
and there is little indication of how courts will treat this issue or how
petitioners and respondents will present their cases. 70 In a few recent
61. Id. at 520.
62. Id. at 521-22.
63. Id
64. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
65. Id at 559.
66. Id. at 561.
67. Id at 565.
68. Id. at 565-66.
69. Id.
70. See SHEREEN ARENT, AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, POST-SUTTON
CASES DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF WHETHER SOMEONE HAS A DISABILITY, at
http://www.diabetes.org/advocacy/table-casesl.asp (last visited Feb. 24,2001).
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cases, the employer did not contest the issue of disability.71 One court
warned employees that Sutton could change their disabled status,
while another court granted a plaintiff's request to submit new
evidence in light of the Sutton trilogy.72 It is likely that employers will
question disability status more frequently. For example, a New York
District Court granted an employer's renewed motion for summary
judgement based on Sutton.73 The court had previously found that
the plaintiff was disabled, but after the Sutton decision the plaintiff
was deemed not disabled based on his medicated state.7 4 Other cases
simply accepted Sutton as authority and quickly dismissed the
individual's claim.75  Plaintiffs that have withstood summary
judgements have focused on the "regarded as" prong of the disability
definition76 or have been creative in the major life activities they
claim are substantially limited.7 7 Ideally this Note will warn future
litigants of what to avoid and will provide helpful strategies for
success.
H. Diabetes
To understand exactly the impact of the Sutton decision on
mitigating measures, it is important to understand diabetes and the
role of insulin. Diabetes is an incurable disease affecting more than
fifteen million Americans.7 8 A person with diabetes has difficulty
converting food into energy because there is a problem with her
insulin production.79 Insulin regulates blood sugar, which is the
71. Dudley v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 213 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 2000) (decision without
published opinion); Cardona v. United Parcel Serv., 79 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.P.R. 2000);
Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 15,23 (Ct. App. 1999).
72. Schaefer v. State Ins. Fund, 207 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2000); Cardona, 79 F. Supp.
2d at 40 n.17.
73. Epstein v. Kalvin-Miller Int'l., Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 222,224 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
74. IL at 224-26.
75. Seaman Unified Sch. Dist. v. Kan. Comm'n on Human Rights, 990 P.2d 155, 158-
59 (Kan. App. 1999); Davis v. Computer Maint. Serv. Inc., No. 01A01-9809-CV-00459,
1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 661, at *21 (Sept. 29,1999) (appeal pending).
76. See Morris v. Dempsey Ing, Inc., No. 99 C 3455, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18042, at
*3 (N.D. III. Nov. 12,1999).
77. See Heimbach v. Lehigh Valley Plastics, Inc., No. 99-2979, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7,2000).
78. SHEREEN ARENT, AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, BACKGROUND
MATERIALS ON DIABETES AND FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS FOR LAWYERS HANDLING
DIABETES DISCRIMINATION CASES, at http://www.diabetes.org/advocacy/discrim-
background.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2001) [hereinafter ARENT, BACKGROUND
MATERIALS]; ADA, FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 4.
79. See ARENT, BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 78.
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body's source of energy.80 When insulin is not properly regulating
blood sugar levels, too much glucose stays in the bloodstream instead
of going to the cells. This leaves cells "starved for energy. '81
Diabetes is generally broken down into two main types: Type I, or
insulin-dependent diabetes, and Type II, or non-insulin-dependent
diabetes. 82
An individual with Type I diabetes develops problems because
her "pancreas stops making insulin or makes only a tiny amount ....
Since insulin is necessary to life, all people with Type I diabetes must
receive insulin every day... [and] would die within a matter of days if
not given insulin artificially. '83 While insulin injections, and other life
modifications, allow many individuals with diabetes to live long and
happy lives, diabetes is still incurable. "These treatments,... do not
correct diabetes... [because] a person with diabetes cannot obtain
glucose control that is comparable-or as good as-what the body
does naturally in the person without diabetes."8 4
Type II diabetes is the more common form of the disease.85 Not
all people with Type II diabetes must use insulin; sometimes diet and
exercise may be enough.86 But Type I diabetes can still create the
same hypoglycemic and hyperglycemic reactions if blood sugar is not
properly controlled through insulin or other lifestyle modifications. 87
A. Treatment
All individuals with diabetes need to monitor their blood sugar
every day through a variety of methods and decisions because trying
to achieve a safe blood sugar level is "a very delicate, and very
crucial, balancing act. ' 88  People with diabetes monitor their
conditions through blood tests, urine tests, and attention to their
bodies' signals.89 Depending on the test results, people with diabetes
must act accordingly to bring blood sugar levels under control.
80. See Juan Bailey, M.D. & Stephanie Golden, Diabetes Mellitus, in 10 ATrORNEY'S
TExT BOOK OF MEDICINE 74-1, 74-6 (Roscoe N. Gray & Louise J. Gordy eds., 2000).
81. AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, WHAT IS TYPE 1 DIABETES?, at
http://www.diabetes.org/ada/Typel.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2001) [hereinafter ADA,
TYPE 1 DIABETES].
82. See Bailey & Golden, supra note 80, at 74-73.
83. ARENT, BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 78.
84. Idi (emphasis removed).
85. ADA, FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 4.
86. Id.
87. ARENT, BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 78.
88. Id
89. Id.
[Vol. 52HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Possible treatments may include insulin shots, eating, or drinking.90
Individuals with diabetes must also monitor their food intake
constantly to keep themselves healthy and sometimes even to keep
themselves alive.91 It is vital that people with diabetes have the break
time needed to test their blood sugar because it is "extremely
important to their ability to be healthy." 92
B. Complications
These measures may not always keep the blood sugar level
normal. There are still dangers of both hypoglycemia (low blood
sugar levels due to too much sugar going to the cells) and
hyperglycemia (high blood sugar-usually more common in
untreated or undertreated diabetes). 93  Individuals with insulin-
dependent diabetes usually do not have a set routine of insulin
injections; the number of injections varies from day to day.94 The
body's blood glucose levels may be affected by variations in exercise,
stress or illness, and even a woman's menstrual cycle. 95 These
external forces can affect blood sugar levels in unpredictable ways.
[E]ven the most stringent awareness and the most diligent
balancing of these factors cannot eliminate the inherent limitations
of diabetes .... While one may know how much insulin to
administer.., in the normal course of the normal day, one cannot
know how much insulin to give to ameliorate the effects of
uncontrollable external forces.96
When these external forces are working on a person with diabetes,
serious reactions to manual blood sugar control can result.97 The
most common complications of diabetes result from hypoglycemia
reactions.98 At its worst, a hypoglycemic reaction can take the form
90. ADA, TYPE 1 DIABETES, supra note 81; ARENT, BACKGROUND MATERIALS,
supra note 78.
91. ARENT, BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 78.
92. Telephone Interview with Katie Kimmel, RN, CDE, St. Charles Medical Center,
(Mar. 3,2000).
93. ADA, TYPE 1 DIABETES, supra note 81.
94. ARENT, BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 78.
95. Id.
96. Amicus Brief of Senators Harkin and Kennedy, Representatives Hoyer and
Owens, and Former Senator Dole in Support of Respondent Kirkingburg at 9-10,
Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (No. 97-1943), in Support of
Petitioner Murphy at 9-10, Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (No. 97-
1992), and in Support of Petitioner Sutton at 9-10, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471 (1999) (No. 98-591).
97. ARENT, BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 78.
98. Bailey & Golden, supra note 80, at 74-33.
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of a coma.99 Low blood sugar may also make a person with diabetes
feel shaky, confused or nervous.1°°
People with both types of diabetes can also encounter blood
sugar levels that are too high, if the amount of insulin is insufficient,
and experience short-term side effects like blurry vision and frequent
urination. People with Type I diabetes can have diabetic
ketoacidosis. 1°1 If insulin is unavailable, glucose cannot get into the
cells. In response to the lack of energy, the person's body produces
an acidic substance called ketones that can cause breathing problems,
nausea, or even a coma.102
People with diabetes also need to be aware of other possible
complications that arise from the disease.10 3 Many complications are
severe and may be life-threatening. They include blindness,1°4 kidney
disease, heart disease, stroke, nerve disease, and amputations. 0 5 The
nerve damage is especially severe; sixty to seventy percent of people
with diabetes have some kind of damage and diabetes is the leading
cause of "non-traumatic lower limb amputations.' ' 06 Amputation
becomes necessary when the nerves on the feet are damaged, because
"the diabetic may not notice blisters or small sores and may continue
to walk on them, preventing them from healing and leading to
infections that do not heal because of inadequate blood supply to the
feet."107
People with diabetes face challenges every day in keeping
healthy. They must maintain an awareness of their bodies and actions
that most Americans do not have. People with Type I diabetes must
be especially aware because they will die without proper insulin.
Beyond the disease itself, diabetes often brings up other health
complications of which people should be aware. While diabetes is
controllable and many people live long and happy lives, diabetes is a
chronic and potentially debilitating disease that deserves protection
from discrimination based on fear and stereotypes.
99. Id.
100. ADA, TYPE 1 DIABETES, supra note 81.
101. ARENT, BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 78.
102. ADA, TYPE 1 DIABETES, supra note 81.
103. ARENT, BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 78.
104. Diabetes is the number-one cause of blindness in people between the ages of 20
and 74. ADA, FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 4.
105. Id.
106. 1d
107. Bailey & Golden, supra note 80, at 74-43,74-44.
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M11. Litigation Challenges after Sutton
A handful of cases concerning individuals with diabetes have
come down since the Supreme Court ruled on the Sutton trilogy.
They not only illustrate the difficulties that now face individuals with
disabilities under the ADA (and similar state laws) but also the
possible strategies that plaintiffs might use to succeed in post-Sutton
litigation. These new cases, along with pre-Sutton diabetes cases,
provide insight on the problems that the decisions create.
Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. illustrates one of the problems
with considering disability in the light of mitigating measures. 0 8 Al
Deschene, an individual with diabetes, was terminated by Pinole
Point Steel ("PPS") and claimed, among other things, that he was
terminated because of his medical conditions. 0 9 Although PPS did
not contest that Deschene was disabled, the court noted the possible
effect that Sutton might have on people with diabetes."0 The court
noted that Sutton "leave[s] open the question of whether under the
ADA a given individual whose medical condition can be mitigated
may still be disabled because the mitigation is either incomplete or
itself limits the employee's ability to perform on the job.""'
The Sutton Court feared that considering a disability in its
unmitigated state would lead to speculation." 2  This fear of
speculation is somewhat more logical when a person's diabetes, or
any other condition, has been successfully treated and controlled for a
number of years and it would be difficult to imagine her life
otherwise. 13 But this analysis is deficient when comparing employers
because different policies and different reasonable accommodations
can cause just as much speculation.114
The Deschene case illustrates this well. Part of Deschene's claim
was that his supervisor "had refused to accommodate his medical
condition.., by refusing to allow him to inject himself with insulin in
a clean location, refused to permit him to eat frequently or rest
108. 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 15,18 (Ct. App. 1999).
109. See icL at 18. Deschene sued under California's Fair Employment and Housing
Act (FEHA), not the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), but the court found that
the FEHA is modeled on the federal statute and is useful in interpreting the California
law. See id. at 23 n.8.
110. Id.
111. I&
112. See supra Part I.C.
113. Interview with Paul D. Grossman, Civil Rights Attorney, Department. of
Education, in San Francisco, Cal. (Feb. 24,2000) [hereinafter Grossman Interview].
114. See id.
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATIONMarch 2001]
periodically.' 1 15 Because Deschene's disability status was not at issue,
the alleged lack of reasonable accommodation did not factor into the
case.116 If Deschene was unable to monitor his diabetes effectively,
he could experience a variety of symptoms that would substantially
limit his major life activities. However, another employer, with more
accommodating policies, might never put him in a position where his
diabetes would be limiting. This situation is full of speculation.
Sutton leaves open the question of whether a court should speculate
as to Deschene's disabilities in the ideal employment situation or take
him as he is in the current situation.
One of the leading pre-Sutton diabetes cases identifies one of the
most troubling issues raised as a result of Sutton. In Arnold v. United
Parcel Service, the First Circuit rejected the notion that disabled
people should be considered with regard to their mitigating
measures. 117 The Arnold court pointed out that this
reading would treat differently a plaintiff... (who takes his
medications and thus would not be protected by the ADA... ) and
a plaintiff who is also diabetic.., but who cannot afford to take his
medications. The latter plaintiff would be protected by the
ADA .... We do not think Congress intended such an anomalous
result.118
The Arnold court also stressed that an individual who could not
afford treatment for her impairment would be covered under the
ADA in hiring, but once she started work and was covered under the
health plan, she would get her treatment and no longer be disabled or
covered by the ADA. 119
The Arnold court highlighted a crucial difference between
reasonable accommodations and mitigating measures. 20 Professor
Paul Grossman describes this as the difference between independent
actions or mitigating measures and dependent actions or reasonable
accommodations. 121 If an individual with a disability can control her
illness with her own independent actions, such as insulin
administration, she will need fewer, if any, reasonable
115. 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 15,23 (Ct. App. 1999).
116. See id. at 23 n.8.
117. 136 F.3d 854, 863 (1st Cir. 1998). Sutton overruled Arnold's finding that
individuals with diabetes should be viewed without considering mitigating measures. 527
U.S. 471, 475 (1999). The Arnold case is still helpful, however, in identifying problems
that the Sutton Court did not address.
118. Arnold, 136 F. 3d at 862.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 863 n.7.
121. Grossman Interview, supra note 113.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
accommodations.'22 This saves the employer money, protects more
Americans with disabilities in the workplace, and encourages people
to take care of their work and health. Also, it is contrary to the Act
to imagine that "Congress wished to provide protection to workers
who leave it to their employers to accommodate their impairments
but to deny protection to workers who act independently to overcome
their disabilities, thereby creating a disincentive to self-help."'' 3
One of the largest problems facing people with diabetes, and
many other individuals with disabilities, is that the Sutton decisions
effectively rob them of a forum to fight discrimination. 24 For
example, Mary is an individual with diabetes who controls her disease
through insulin.'25 Part of Mary's ability to effectively control her
disease involves checking her blood sugar levels with a blood test
numerous times a day. If Mary's employer is unwilling to allow her to
take these necessary breaks, she should be able to sue under the
ADA.
The ADA was passed for just such a situation: to ensure that a
qualified individual with diabetes has the opportunity to work with
reasonable accommodations. Sutton, however, works a contrary
result. A court could choose to look at Mary's controlled diabetes
and decide that she is not disabled. But if she cannot check her blood
sugar often enough, she could experience hyperglycemic reactions
that will keep her from work and cause her to lose her job. But is she
still not disabled when the employer is not letting her use her
mitigating measures? Sutton robs Mary of her forum-she never has
a chance to prove that she is a qualified individual or, if the employer
provided reasonable accommodations, that she could perform her job
as well as, if not better than, any other average person. 26
This hypothetical situation was touched upon in Nawrot v. CPC
InternationaL'27 That court found a question of material fact as to
whether the employer had denied Nawrot's request for reasonable
accommodations. 128 Unfortunately the court was unable to reach the
issue because the plaintiff was not disabled under Sutton. 29 The court
reasoned that,
122. See Arnold, 136 F. 3d at 863 n.7.
123. Id
124. Grossman Interview, supra note 113.
125. This is a hypothetical, and not based on any real person named Mary.
126. See, e.g., Barhorst, supra note 38, at 165 n.244.
127. No. 99-C-630, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8973, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 22,2000).
128. Id. at *20.
129. Id. at *19-20.
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[t]he Sutton rationale leads to a distorted result. Although a court
must consider the effect of mitigating measures when determining
whether... impaired plaintiffs are entitled to statutory protection
from discrimination, the alleged failure to accommodate can
preclude a plaintiff from utilizing those mitigating measures on the
job.... In the aftermath of Sutton, ADA plaintiffs are placed in a
legal bind; the employer strips the plaintiff of all ameliorative
measures, but in court, the judge pretends that the plaintiff is
always clothed in these measures.130
This "legal bind" is not determinative however. There are
strategies that can aid plaintiffs with diabetes receive the full
protection of the law.
IV. Creative Solutions
The Sutton decision leaves unanswered questions and increases
difficulties for people with diabetes. But these difficulties can be
overcome with a little creativity. Solutions include: focusing on the
complications stemming from diabetes, not the disease itself;
ingenious "major life activities"; using the "record of" and "regarded
as" prongs of the disability definition; and possibly even
distinguishing Sutton.
A. Complications and Reactions
Diabetic complications can provide a way around the Sutton
pitfalls. In Seaman Unified School District v. Kansas Commission on
Human Rights, the court quickly disposed of the employee's
complaints under Sutton because the "defendant was able to control
his diabetes with proper diet and monitoring and his physical
activities were not limited.131  But Seaman still brings up an
interesting point. Reed, the employee, was unable to perform
janitorial jobs, including lifting, because of a corrective surgery he had
undergone to correct a diabetes-related eye problem. 132 While this
surgery only minimally restricted his major life of activity of working,
it is a good example of how diabetes is not so clear-cut. Many
complications are associated with diabetes even if the individual is
dedicated to taking his insulin and maintaining a proper diet.133
Gerald Needle was recognized as an individual with a disability
because he also focused on the complications caused by diabetes.134
130. Id. at *19-21.
131. 990 P.2d 155,158 (Kan. App. 1999).
132. Id. at 157.
133. See supra Part II.
134. See Needle v. Ailing & Cory, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 100,105 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
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Needle did not even allege that his treated diabetes limited any life
activity. Instead, the court found that Needle was substantially
limited in the major life activity of walking because his right toes had
been amputated, his left heel surgically removed, and his vision
impaired.135 These are not rare complications, but they provide
alternative paths to disabled status when the disease itself is
effectively treated.
Another creative and helpful case in detailing the complications
and reactions produced by insulin is Coghlan v. HJ Heinz Co. and
Ore-Ida Foods, Inc. 136 Coghian explained how his major life activities
of eating, sleeping and caring for himself were affected even though
he took insulin to control his diabetes. 137 The insulin he took caused
potentially debilitating hypoglycemic reactions:
I have awakened in the middle of the night in the most advanced
state of hypoglycemia prior to unconsciousness. While in this state
I was, and I am, only able to muster the physical movement of
obtaining and drinking a glass of juice or eating a piece of fruit to
alleviate the hypoglycemic episode. During these episodes caring
for myself is problematic and I am unable to sleep. I have
experienced severe hypoglycemic episodes short of
unconsciousness and this is a result, in part, of a tight insulin control
of my blood sugar levels, which are considered medically
recommended for my condition.138
The court denied defendant's motion for summary judgement based
on this testimony and evidence that Coghian's diabetes has so
seriously affected his eyes that an operation was required to correct
the damage. 139
B. Major Life Activities
The major life activity that the plaintiff focuses on can be
determinative of a court's disability determination. Most plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases claim a substantial limit in their life
activity of working. This can be difficult because having a
substantially limited life activity of working means that the plaintiff is
limited in "the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person
having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to
135. Id.
136. 851 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
137. Id. at 814.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 814-15.
March2001] DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
perform a single; particular job does not constitute a substantial
limitation.' 140 This standard is troublesome because it "creates a
Catch-22 for plaintiffs who must prove that they are so limited in
order to prove coverage under the statute that the next inquiry about
whether he or she is qualified is undermined.' 4' The working activity
is also problematic because Sutton called into question its viability as
a category generally.142
If plaintiffs do include working as a major life activity, they must
be sure to explain the specific complications and reactions that people
with diabetes experience. Most of the hypo- and hyperglycemic
reactions arising from diabetes would preclude people from a wide
range of jobs, not just a particular class of jobs or a specific job. If
Mary becomes dizzy, confused, or even lapses into a coma, this will
affect any job from airline pilot to assembly line worker, from janitor
to lawyer143
One of the best examples of being creative with major life
activities is found in the pre-Sutton case of Erjavac v. Holy Family
Health Plus.144 Sandra Erjavac had insulin-dependent diabetes. She
brought suit under the ADA after she quit her job due to the
employer's unwillingness to accommodate her.145 Even though
Erjavac took insulin to keep her diabetes under control, she still
needed to urinate constantly and her employer did not provide her
with enough access to the bathroom. 146 The court found that Erjavac
was substantially limited in the major life activity of waste
elimination, noting that the "average adult does not need such
frequent access to the bathroom that they soil themselves while
waiting to use it."147 Erjavac was also required to eat specific foods at
numerous times during the day to control her blood sugar levels.
"[W]hen her blood sugar drops, Erjavac must stop all other activities
and pursue the kinds of foods that will bring her levels back to
normal." 48 Even though waste elimination does not appear on the
EEOC's non-exclusive list of major life activities, the court reasoned
that "eating and waste elimination are both essential to remaining
140. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (1999).
141. Arlene B. Mayerson & Kristan S. Mayer, Defining Disability in the Aftermath of
Sutton: Where Do We Go from Here?, 27 HuM. RTS. 13,16 (2000).
142. 527 U.S. 471, 477 (1999).
143. See supra Part II.
144. 13 F. Supp. 2d 737 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
145. Id. at 740-41.
146. Id. at 740, 746.
147. Id. at 747.
148. Id. at 746.
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alive. As such, these activities are even more significant than the
listed activities of working or learning, neither of which is essential to
sustain life."'149
Notably, the court also found Erjavac disabled in her untreated
state.150 The court was aware of the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Sutton.15' Therefore, it most likely went through the analysis of
diabetes in its treated state to avoid a possible conflict with the Sutton
ruling. The court focused on the major life activity of life itself;
stating that without proper control a drop in blood sugar levels could
put the plaintiff in a coma or worse.152 The Erjavac court recognized
that diabetes is a serious, chronic disease, a recognition that the
Sutton Court seemed to ignore. Given the spirit and intent of the
ADA, it seems truly unbelievable that an individual who takes
medicine to stay alive does not have a disability. Insulin and glasses
are not analogous mitigating measures and courts should not treat
them as such.
Another potentially valuable major life activity is walking. Not
only can diabetic complications lead to amputations, 53 diabetes can
also cause neuropathy or nerve damage in the lower extremities.154
Neuropathy can severely limit an individual's ability to walk long
distances or for extended periods of time. 55 Limitations on walking
have saved at least two plaintiffs from summary judgement. 156
Diabetes is a very complex disease that affects people in a variety
of ways, with or without mitigating measures. Pamela Shirley's
diabetes produced digestive tract problems that caused frequent
vomiting and diarrhea.157 So, even though her insulin kept her blood
sugar more or less under control, she had to monitor her diet
extremely carefully to avoid these severe and sudden digestive
problems.5 8 The court found that her major life activity of eating was
therefore substantially limited.159
149. Id. at 747.
150. Id. at 746.
151. See id. at 745 n.3.
152. Id. at 746.
153. See supra Part II.
154. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432,435 (7th Cir. 2000).
155. I
156. Id at 438-40; Davis v. Rockford Springs Co., No. 98 C 50351, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18131, at *13,14 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12,2000).
157. Shirley v. Westgate Fabrics, Inc. No. 3:95-CV-2550-D, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16545, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 19,1997).
158. Id at *8.
159. See id
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C. "Record of" and "Regarded as"
Another solution for many people with diabetes is to try to prove
they have a record of a substantially limiting impairment. This is a
viable claim for individuals with Type II diabetes especially, because
this disease often develops much later in life. Individuals may not
know that they have a disease until "severe symptoms occur or they
are treated for one of its serious complications. '160 This often means
that there is a record of hospitalization, implying that the individual
was arguably substantially limited in some major life activity
depending on the specific complication.161 Courts have continued to
find that hospitalization for diabetes and related complications can be
considered a record.162 The Sutton decision ignores the "immediate
detrimental affects that diabetics ... suffer at the onset" and so the
record prong becomes a useful way around the decision.163
While the Sutton Court may have modified the "regarded as"
prong,164 plaintiffs can still argue that they are regarded as disabled
even if their mitigating measures keep them from being disabled. If
the employer makes a decision not to hire an individual because she
believes that the individual is substantially limited, whether or not the
individual has an impairment, then the individual is regarded as
disabled.165 Because of the stringent blood testing and insulin
injections people with diabetes require, an employer may wrongly
view someone with diabetes as substantially limited. To people with
limited knowledge of diabetes, it must seem extremely limiting to
have to inject yourself during the normal working day. Or an
employer may restrict a current employee's workload after witnessing
a hypoglycemic episode, even though the employee ability to work
has not been affected.166 This is exactly the kind of myth from which
the ADA protects individuals.167 Employers might exclude an
160. ADA, FACrS AND FIGURES, supra note 4.
161. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987) (finding that an
"impairment... serious enough to require hospitalization, [is] ... more than sufficient to
establish that one or more of her major life activities were substantially limited by her
impairment. Thus, Arline's hospitalization... suffices to establish that she has a 'record
of... impairment."').
162. See Shirley, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16545, at *9.
163. Barhorst, supra note 38, at 164.
164. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471,476-77 (1999).
165. Labor, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1) (1999).
166. Price v. Dolphin Servs., Inc., No. 99-3888, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19515, at *27
(E.D. La. Dec. 5,2000).
167. See id.
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individual with diabetes because of safety or liability concerns or cost
or even acceptance by coworkers.168
Morris v. Dempsey Ing, Inc.169 illustrates that these stereotypes
do still exist and that the "regarded as" prong is still a viable option in
the post-Sutton courtroom. Morris did not consider himself disabled
but claimed that the employer regarded him as disabled.170 There are
still stereotypes and misconceptions about diabetes; Morris alleged
that his employer told him that diabetes was a liability.'7' Morris did
not plead this charge correctly. The court denied defendant's motion
for summary judgement and encouraged Morris to replead.172
D. Factual Distinction
Another avenue that is so far untried is to attempt to distinguish
Sutton from cases like our hypothetical Mary's. 7 3 The Southern
District Court of Indiana was not persuaded that Sutton would allow
employers to interfere with an employee's use of corrective measures
with no legal consequences.174 Sutton is factually distinguishable.
United Air Lines had a job qualification based on an applicant's
untreated state, while cases like Mary's involve an employer
prohibiting the use of "corrective measures that were essential to ...
health and life as well as to ... ability to do the job.175 The court did
not explore this factual distinction or decide the issue but found it
"inconceivable that such actions by an employer would be entirely
beyond the reach of the ADA on the theory that the employee does
not have a 'disability' under the ADA.' 1 76 This is a difficult argument
to make because Sutton is clearly not a narrow holding.177
Conclusion
The issues that arise from Sutton are just beginning to be debated
and litigated. The Sutton trilogy will have lasting and substantial
effects on the ADA and on the millions of Americans with
168. Id.
169. No. 99 C 3455,1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18042, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 1999).
170. Id.
171. I& at *8.
172. 1& at *9.
173. See supra Part III.
174. See Denney v. Mosey Mfg. Co., Inc., No. IP 98-852-C HIG, 2000 US. Dist. LEXIS
7203, at *26-27 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 20,2000).
175. Id. at *27.
176. Id.
177. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471,475 (1999).
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disabilities. While a restrictive ruling in the eyes of disability
advocates, Sutton does not mean the death of the ADA.
It is unfortunate that the future of the ADA was placed in
jeopardy by a vision requirement. Without diminishing the severity
of the Sutton sister's vision impairment, it is not life threatening.
Glasses are not as necessary to survival as insulin is. The Sutton
decision draws a broad rule from a very discrete and narrow factual
situation, and then extends it over the entire ADA-that disability
should be determined with regard to mitigating measures.
This broad rule suggests that the Court had a lack of information
or understanding about disabilities such as diabetes which require
constant and vigilant monitoring. Putting on a pair of glasses in the
morning is not the same kind of mitigating measure as injecting
yourself with insulin numerous times a day. Perhaps a future court
will recognize the seriousness of diabetes, and other impairments, and
narrow Sutton's reach. Until then or until society's "accumulated
myths and fears" have disappeared, individuals with diabetes must be
creative in their litigation to protect themselves from the specter of
discrimination.
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